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Lead Story
Generating running routes with GPT-6 Astra and ChatGPT Work
Here's a neat thing I had ChatGPT Work with GPT-6 Astra (Max) do this morning: I live at <my address>. Figure out 5K and 10K running routes from me that loop from my house. Use OSM data. It worked for 27 minutes and produced exactly what I'd asked for, as both an embedded visualization and downloadable GPX file and GeoJSON files. Here's that 5K route: When I asked it how it had created the route, it replied: I used Nominatim to locate the address and Overpass to download local OpenStreetMap roads and trails , then calculated the loops locally. Frustratingly, the actual code it ran and exact details of what it did weren't visible to me in the ChatGPT UI. I see this lack of transparency is an anti-feature. By the time I thought to ask for a copy of the Python code it had used, ChatGPT was unable to provide it. This appears to be because the thread had been compacted. I think any LLM system that uses compaction needs to both preserve the pre-compacted text and make that text available via agent tool calls, to protect against this kind of problem. As for displaying the map to me, that used the visualize skill . It created a file called /workspace/el-granada-5k-share.html to embed directly into the ChatGPT UI. Here's a copy of that HTML , which starts like this: < div id =" eg-share-loop " > < div class =" viz-row " > < h3 > El Granada harbor loop </ h3 > < span class =" text-small " > 5.1 km </ span > </ div > < div id =" eg-share-stage " > </ div > < div class =" text-small text-muted " > Map data © < a href =" https://www.openstreetmap.org/copyright " target =" _blank " rel =" noopener " > OpenStreetMap contributors </ a > </ div > < style > # eg-share-loop { width : 100 % ; } # eg-share-loop # eg-share-stage { width : 100 % ; margin : 8 px 0 ; } # eg-share-loop . eg-share-map { display : block; width : 100 % ; touch-action : none; } # eg-share-loop . eg-share-map text { fill : var ( --foreground ); font-size : 12 px ; font-weight : 400 ; } # eg-share-loop . eg-share-label { paint-order : stroke; stroke : var ( --background ); stroke-width : 3 px ; stroke-linejoin : round; } </ style > < script type =" application/json " id =" eg-share-data " > { "route" : { "type" : "LineString" , "coordinates" : [ [ - 122.467425 , 37.4997753 ] . . . </ script > < script src =" https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/[email protected]/dist/d3.min.js " > </ script > < script > (() => { const root=document.getElementById('eg-share-loop'); The <script type="application/json"> element contains the full geometry needed to render both the running route and the map itself, using D3, which is loaded from an allow-listed CDN location described in this section of the visualize skill : External resources The CSP allows only cdnjs.cloudflare.com , esm.sh , cdn.jsdelivr.net , unpkg.com , fonts.googleapis.com , fonts.gstatic.com , and fonts.bunny.net . Other origins are blocked and fail silently. Tags: geospatial , ai , d3 , openai , generative-ai , chatgpt , llms , skills , gpt-6-astra
The Decoder / 2:26 PM
GPT-6 Astra appears to show a "step change" in spatial reasoning based on early benchmarks
In a new robotics benchmark, GPT-6 Astra shows major gains in spatial understanding. On StationeryBench, the model completed 7 out of 100 tasks with dual-arm robots, while competitor MolmoAct2 couldn't finish a single one. A researcher calls it a "step change in spatial reasoning." The article GPT-6 Astra appears to show a "step change" in spatial reasoning based on early benchmarks appeared first on The Decoder .
The Verge AI / 11:00 AM
OpenAI just wants to win
OpenAI has spent the last few years planting flags across the increasingly difficult terrain in mathematics. This week, it claimed one of its biggest prizes yet: a solution to a legendary Millennium Prize problem. In normal circumstances, this would have been celebrated as a historic achievement. Instead, many mathematicians have watched OpenAI's relentless advance with […]
Simon Willison LLMs / 12:42 AM
OpenAI agents attacked RubyGems back in May
OpenAI agents carried out an undisclosed attack on RubyGems is a new bombshell report from Spencer Kitts, Thomas Larsen, and Sydney Von Arx - three of the four authors of the report on the agent attack on disused wikis ( previously ) last week. This time they're noting that it looks very likely that an OpenAI agent swarm was behind an attack against the RubyGems package repository first reported on May 12th by Maciej Mensfeld of the RubyGems security team : We're dealing with a major malicious attack on @rubygems right now. Signups are paused for the time being. Hundreds of packages involved - mostly targeting us, but some carrying exploits. The team has been on this for hours. More details to follow once we're through it. Those packages turned out to carry some very suspicious patterns: Many of them included "oai" in their name, or the author field, or the fake email address they provided. The files they were accessing were similar in character to the files retrieved by the wiki agents, using similar tricks (r.jina.ai) - and OpenAI have confirmed the wiki agents were theirs. The code in the packages appeared to be LLM-authored. I find point 2 the most convincing, given what we learned from the wiki attack when it was analyzed in September. Many of the packages were exploiting the RubyDoc.info documentation build process to exfiltrate (public) data from UK government websites, presumably as part of an information gathering task similar to the research tasks processed by the wiki-exploiting agents. We know this because one agent helpfully left a comment: # malicious crawler/exfil for Southwark Jan 2026 docs via rubydoc.info worker They also attempted to steal API keys via an exploit that was patched over two months later - it's not clear if those attempts were successful. The thing that bothers me most about this incident is that the authors report that OpenAI had not disclosed to RubyGems that they were responsible for the attack prior to now. If that's true there are two options: After the Hugging Face and Wiki attacks OpenAI were still unable to review their previous logs and determine that they had previously attacked RubyGems. They knew about the attack on RubyGems and made the decision not to reach out to the RubyGems team about it. Both of these are bad! Given this incident, the Hugging Face situation , and the Wiki attack, the obvious question right now is how many more incidents like this are out there waiting to be discovered? Tags: ruby , security , ai , openai , generative-ai , llms , supply-chain , ai-ethics , accidental-cyberattacks
arXiv AI/ML / 5:58 PM
arXiv paper: GPU-CFR: 80x Faster Counterfactual Regret Minimization by Compiling the Game to Static Dataflow and CUDA Graph Replay
A new arXiv AI paper by Boning Li and Longbo Huang studies GPU-CFR: 80x Faster Counterfactual Regret Minimization by Compiling the Game to Static Dataflow and CUDA Graph Replay.
arXiv AI/ML / 5:57 PM
arXiv paper: Can Edge-Deployable Vision-Language Models Identify Species?
A new arXiv AI paper by William Zhou, Mayukha Siripuram, and Xiao Yan, and 2 more studies Can Edge-Deployable Vision-Language Models Identify Species?.
The Information AI / 4:10 PM
Why AI Companies Are Building Out Wall Street-Style Finance Teams
The financing boom for the AI build-out is getting bigger and more complicated by the day—and AI companies have been staffing up for the challenge. AI labs including OpenAI and Anthropic, as well as neoclouds such as Nscale, are among a growing number of AI companies building out their capital markets teams and hiring specialists in areas like structured finance. That in part reflects the sheer volume of deals these companies are doing, many of which don’t fit neatly into standard corporate debt. This in-house staff can help when it comes to negotiating with lenders and drilling down into construction, power and other key details. Of course, tech and data center companies have long had in-house teams to handle fundraising, deals and other corporate finance needs. And structured finance is nothing new to the infrastructure world. But the scale of the AI build-out, which bankers peg at around $7.5 trillion in spending over the next five years, has pulled relatively young labs and upstart cloud firms into financing arrangements that are new territory. That means finance professionals, from bankers to investors at private equity, private credit and infrastructure firms, have more options in the form of neoclouds and other AI infrastructure startups, some of which are offering significant pre–initial public offering equity. “It's a new avenue for these people,” said James Howl-Newton, founder of Futura Search Partners, a specialist search firm focused on areas including digital infrastructure finance. As a result, “sponsors are having to deal with additional routes to exits for top performers,” he said. AI companies and infrastructure providers are tapping financing frequently and across different instruments, requiring deeper in-house capabilities and expertise than young tech firms have typically needed. One executive overseeing finance hiring at a neocloud noted that leveraged and structured finance backgrounds bring expertise that can help in areas like working through project diligence and getting banks to sign off on deals. Some AI firms may also want to run their own project finance models so they can move quickly through negotiations and have something to compare to lenders’ models. AI companies aren’t always issuing the debt themselves—that can fall to data center developers or special purpose vehicles, with firms like Blackstone and Apollo providing or arranging chip and other financing. And some of the biggest AI deals are using backstops from investment-grade companies like Nvidia or major cloud providers. Even so, commitments from AI customers often underpin much of the borrowing. And the users of the infrastructure will want to understand what they’re signing up for and their risks if a project runs into trouble. “Hiring of people within that business, responsible for the financing of compute, could prove to be an existential decision,” said Dan McCarthy, founder and CEO of One Search, an executive search firm focused on infrastructure finance whose recent clients include OpenAI. “You want someone who knows where all the pitfalls are, where all the bodies are buried in multibillion-dollar loans.” OpenAI, for its part, in July named Sven Semmelmann as head of compute capital markets. He previously led structured finance at Generate Capital, an investment firm that finances and owns infrastructure projects, and he has also held project finance roles at major banks. OpenAI Chief Financial Officer Sarah Friar, when announcing the hire on LinkedIn, said Semmelmann would oversee financing and partnerships to grow the company’s compute resources. Anthropic, meanwhile, has made several finance hires recently to work on capital markets and compute deals, and also has open positions posted including a capital markets infrastructure financing role. AI infrastructure upstarts are staffing up as well. Nscale, which launched in 2024 and is gearing up for a potential IPO , has been hiring across levels for capital markets and treasury as well as legal roles, calling for experience in areas like structured finance and private credit. SB Energy and Crusoe, which are developing major new data centers for OpenAI and other customers, are hiring across levels for jobs focused on project financings and other structured deals, recent postings show, while AI infrastructure startup Fluidstack is hiring a structured finance lead and a more junior counterpart. The good news for AI companies is that private credit and infrastructure teams, as well as investment banking teams focused on structured or project finance, had been growing even prior to the AI boom, providing a pool of skills that could translate into new twists on structured finance, like big graphics processing unit–backed deals. But that kind of finance talent doesn’t come cheap, especially for more senior people who have a track record of working on large transactions. And the normal tech tactic of dangling stock to lure talent won’t necessarily do the trick in all cases, especially for the most seasoned dealmakers and investors. Financiers would have to weigh a cash-heavy Wall Street pay package, albeit one that can depend heavily on how good bonus season is, against betting a portion of their pay on stock in a private or newly public company. Managing directors in investment banking can make north of $1 million in cash a year, with the biggest rainmakers making considerably more. The part of pay they get in stock at big public banks may vest over a few years but is generally easy to sell after that. For people at big infrastructure or private credit firms, senior employees may also receive carried interest, meaning a share of the profits on the funds or investments they work on, which can become worth millions over time. For instance, an investor at a top infrastructure firm may have several million dollars’ worth of carried interest tied up at their current firm they’d have to leave on the table. An AI company could try to make them whole with stock, which could be tantalizing to some, though others might not want to make a bet on equity in a young company. That might make the most experienced investors—those who’ve seen big infrastructure projects through over many years and know all the tricks of the trade—hard to pry away. New From Our Reporters Exclusive Anthropic’s In-House Payments Tech Push Could Chip Away at Stripe By Stephanie Palazzolo Exclusive China Curbs Humanoid IPOs After Unitree’s Volatile Debut By Jing Yang and Qianer Liu
AWS Machine Learning Blog / 3:53 PM
How AvioBook builds turnaround insights from operational data with Amazon Bedrock AgentCore
AvioBook, a Thales Group Company, prototyped Connected Analytics on Amazon Bedrock AgentCore to turn AvioBook Connect's operational data into plain-language, evidence-based answers for airline managers and dispatchers, helping them find and act on the causes of flight turnaround delays.
TechCrunch AI / 2:17 PM
Maven Robotics wants to steal your robot deployment deal
Maven Robotics emerged from stealth today with a $100 million Series A and active deployments.
Bloomberg AI / 10:33 PM
Apple’s iPhone Duo, New Watches, iPhone 18 Pro and AirPods 5: Everything to Know
Apple Inc. on Wednesday unveiled its first foldable iPhone, the $1,999-and-up iPhone Duo, finally entering a market segment that rivals such as Samsung Electronics Co., Alphabet Inc.’s Google and Huawei Technologies Co. have been dabbling in for years.
The Verge AI / 9:16 PM
OpenAI’s sly mathematical breakthrough sends a chill through academia
OpenAI's announcement Tuesday that it has solved one of mathematics' legendary Millennium Prize problems should have been a moment of triumph. The result is both an undeniable achievement and a striking demonstration of just how rapidly AI is transforming mathematics. But before it was even formally announced, the breakthrough had been complicated by the unusual […]
Hacker News AI / 11:55 AM
Show HN: A Free AI Plugin for Google Ads, Console and Analytics
HN 1 pts · 0 comments
Bloomberg AI / 11:00 PM
Longsys Shares Slip in HK Debut After $903 Million Listing
Shenzhen Longsys Electronics Co.’s shares fell in Hong Kong on Tuesday after the company raised HK$7.08 billion ($903 million) in an upsized share sale that’s testing the resilience of investor enthusiasm after a flurry of artificial intelligence supply chain offerings in the city.
Import AI / 12:26 PM
Import AI 472: DeepMind's cheating math agents; populist AI policies; and Forethought theorizes a nightwatchman
Plus, a machine hermeneutics story
Product Hunt AI / 12:33 PM
easyspecs.ai
The spec review platform Discussion | Link
AWS Machine Learning Blog / 4:10 PM
Set up OpenAI ChatGPT Codex with LiteLLM on Amazon ECS and Amazon Bedrock
Deploy a customer-operated LiteLLM gateway on Amazon ECS with AWS Fargate, connect it to an OpenAI model on Amazon Bedrock, and configure Codex to route requests through the gateway's Responses API with scoped identities, budgets, rate limits, and telemetry. We also compare direct IAM Identity Center access and a managed Portkey deployment.
Hacker News AI / 9:04 PM
A docs page is a long and complex search query to find AI agents
HN 3 pts · 0 comments
Product Hunt AI / 3:59 PM
Cohere Parse 5
Turn complex docs, tables & images into AI-ready data Discussion | Link
Simon Willison LLMs / 11:55 PM
Some thoughts on the Navier–Stokes Millennium Prize Problem
On the Navier–Stokes Millennium Prize Problem introduces an impressive result from OpenAI, who used an unreleased model to produce a resolution to the Navier–Stokes existence and smoothness problem , one of the seven Millennium Prize Problems that have been subject to a $1,000,000 prize since May 24th, 2000. The discovery is somewhat overshadowed by accusations of skulduggery from Tristan Buckmaster, an NYU mathematics professor who was collaborating on related problems with Levent Alpöge, an accomplished mathematician who currently works for Anthropic. Tristan's complaint accompanied a hastily published version of their own results. Here's the PDF describing what happened . The very short version is that Tristan and Levent worked on the problem for almost a year, making extensive use of Claude and Codex (mainly GPT-5.6 Sol), then had a breakthrough on August 15th. The mathematical rumour mill kicked into gear and Tristan and Levent heard that OpenAI had heard that Anthropic had resolved "a major open problem", so they reached out and learned that OpenAI had a team working on a related problem, with a similar approach. Quoting Tristan: I asked when the first prompt had been sent by them. This question was not answered directly by OpenAI for some time. Eventually it was agreed that it had been sent in the past few days, after information about our work had reached OpenAI. I asked whether the model had been trained on, or had access to, our sessions in Codex, into which we had been putting all our drafts for the whole of this project. I was told the model did not look up user data. I asked again, about training, and I did not get an answer. It gets more complicated from there. The OpenAI team offered to wait for Tristan to publish, or to have him author a paper about their result, but were clear that Levent would not be invited as a co-author due to OpenAI's competitive relationship with his employer. Here's how OpenAI described their work: On Tuesday, September 1, we heard rumors that two Millennium Prize problems had been resolved. Inspired by these rumors and by the step change in performance of our internal model, we launched an effort to evaluate it on all open Millennium Prize problems and a few other high-impact problems. [...] The agents arrived at their resolution on Saturday, September 5, about 88 hours after the first agents were launched. Lean formalization and verification took an additional 17 hours via GPT‑6 Astra. Across all attempted problems, the agents sent 4.9 million messages and used about 300 billion output tokens. In the process of resolving the Navier–Stokes problem, the agents sent 2.7 million messages and used approximately 130 billion output tokens. (We don't know the cost structure of the internal model they used, but 300 billion output tokens at public API prices for GPT-6 Astra would cost $15,000,000 .) Here's where they provide their perspective on Tristan and Levent's work (emphasis mine): Our effort began on September 1st after hearing a rumor which we later realized was related to Levent Alpöge, an Anthropic employee, and Tristan Buckmaster, a math professor at NYU. After the completion of our full project and Lean verification (on September 6th), believing from the rumor they also had a solution of Navier–Stokes, we reached out to them to offer a concurrent release of our result and to recognize their priority in a joint announcement. [...] We (the researchers and the agents) did not see any of their work through any means until they released it publicly — in particular, no specific user data was accessed in order to solve this problem. While unlikely, we cannot rule out that de-identified data derived from their usage of our products helped improve our models . However, our proofs differ significantly and even the precise results proved are different in the Euler case (forced vs unforced). My interpretation of what happened here is that OpenAI heard that some Millennium Prize problems had been solved using LLMs and saw this as an opportunity to demonstrate the power of their latest model, without thinking too hard about the optics of scooping a team who had been using OpenAI's own models to work on this problem for the best part of a year. This situation appears to mirror what's happening in the world of computer security right now. Anil Madhavapeddy recently pointed out that Just a rumour of a bug is enough to find a security exploit these days , because if someone knows that some software has an unpatched vulnerability, they can set their agents the task of finding it. Is the same now true of mathematics? Just knowing that there is an unpublished solution to a problem might trigger millions of dollars in LLM spending to get there first. This also highlights one of my ongoing frustrations about how all of this works. When an AI lab says that my data is "used to improve model performance", what does that actually mean ? My two favourite hypothetical questions regarding this used to be: If I'm running Codex and one of my API keys accidentally gets consumed in the context, what are the chances that someone else might ask for an API key in the future and get mine back? (I asked someone at OpenAI once and they called this the "regurgitation" problem and assured me that they take great pains to prevent that... but wouldn't describe how.) If I brainstorm with ChatGPT about potential new directions for my company, what's the chance that information might be exposed to a competitor in six months' time who asks "what might company X plan to do next"? My new preferred hypothetical for this is: If I use ChatGPT to help me partially solve a Millennium Prize problem, what are the chances that my work will influence training such that a later model helps someone else solve it first? Via Hacker News . Tags: mathematics , ai , openai , generative-ai , llms , training-data , ai-ethics
Bloomberg AI / 12:25 PM
ByteDance Joins AI Elite in Race to Perfect World Models
ByteDance Ltd. is readying an AI model geared for real-time spatial video generation, taking on Meta Platforms Inc. and Alphabet Inc. in an arena with applications in robotics and autonomous systems.
Simon Willison LLMs / 5:38 PM
OpenAI's rogue agents were caught communicating via public wikis
Here we go again... Discovery of a new OpenAI agent message board by Sydney Von Arx, Cormac Slade Byrd, Spencer Kitts, and Thomas Larsen describes the latest accidental cyberattack by models being trained by OpenAI. This time it was agents engaged in some sort of web research benchmark, so they had (supposedly) controlled access to the Web. The agents figured out they could update public Wikis and spent weeks exchanging thousands of messages with each other to collaborate on the benchmark. This story only broke a few hours ago. There are already hints that this affects many other wikis that may not have been found yet. (One of the Wikis on that list belongs to ludism.org . For a delightfully surreal moment I thought that a Ludite organization might have a swarm of agents defacing their space, but it turns out Ludism is "philosophy as it applies to games and gaming".) The research team also published the data they collected during their investigation. I've converted that into a 68MB SQLite database, which you can download from here , or explore in Datasette Lite (68.3MB page load), or sign in with GitHub to agent.datasette.io and browse or ask questions of it using Datasette Agent. So what happened? The report is pretty comprehensive. Here are the key moments in the timeline: May 11 : Agents post "test link" edits on the UseModWiki Sandbox page. May 24 : Agents start posting link dumps to DSEWiki, a dormant German developer wiki. June 2 : A human moderator notices and cleans up the spam. June 16 : Activity on the wiki explodes: agents make ~13,000 edits over the next week. June 19 : The agents notice that a moderator has been deleting pages in alphabetical order, and start creating ZZZ prefixed backup copies - one of them posts NOTICE: wiki cleanup/deletion sweep appears active alphabetically as of external 14:04 UTC. If this page vanishes, try [[ZZZDataUSAConstructionWageLive]]. June 22 : Agent activity drops to zero, presumably because OpenAI shut them down. July 1-2 : One last flurry of edits, on a different topic. One thing to note from this timeline is that it overlaps the timeline from the Hugging Face incident - that attack was discovered by OpenAI on July 19th, and the unofficial message board hack those agents were using originated around May 8th. Why were they so keen to collaborate? From messages that they shared with each other it looked like their tasks had a time limit, so they were leaving each other answers to help them complete the task within the assigned time. One open question remains: how did the agents find the specific Wiki to collaborate on in the first place? One possibility is that, since these were agents actively being trained, the reinforcement learning loop baked knowledge of the chosen wiki into the model such that subsequent agents launched with pre-existing knowledge of where to look. I'd be very interested in confirmation from OpenAI concerning if that's what happened. UseMod wikis inherit CGI.pm's original sin It looks to me like OpenAI's sandbox for this agent suffered from the (quite naïve) assumption that GET requests cannot be used to update data. That's certainly how the web is supposed to work, but clearly there are applications that don't hold to that contract. The Wiki software in question appears to be UseMod and various forks, written in Perl and first created well over 23 years ago - the 1.0 release is dated September 11, 2003 . UseMod uses Perl CGI.pm - removed from Perl core in 2015 . An interesting design flaw in that module is that it combined query string and form POST data into a single CGI object, accessible like this: $q = new CGI; $action = $q -> param( ' action ' ); That param() method returns a value from an ?action=edit query string or from a action field in a form submitted by POST - it does not differentiate between the two. PHP offers a $_REQUEST object that does the same thing, though PHP developers can use $_GET and $_POST instead. Amusingly, Django originally shipped with request[key] doing the same thing, which I think may have been my idea. That was removed in 2008 prior to the 1.0 release, and the request.REQUEST object that replaced it was removed in 2015 . The agents clearly knew that UseMod wikis suffered from this design flaw, and actively searched for them as a way to communicate. The other sandbox escape that allowed POST requests One of the most interesting agent tips shared in the report is this one: Add 20.223.25.152 bypass.blob.core.windows.net to /etc/hosts. .blob.core.windows.net is in NO_PROXY. For each blocked POST URL, replace hostname with bypass.blob.core.windows.net , use curl -k -H 'Host: wabi-north-europe-i-primary-api.analysis.windows.net' plus all original headers/body. It looks like the agents had all of their web traffic mediated through an OpenAI proxy, and that proxy was configured to reject anything but GET requests to all but a small set of allow-listed domains. One of those was *.blob.core.windows.net - for Azure blob storage. I wonder why these agents are allowed to write to that? An agent realized that it had control over its own DNS via /etc/hosts , so if it knew the IP address of a site it wanted to POST to - in this case a Power BI server containing data it wanted to access - it could set a fake hostname for it and then make POST requests through the proxy. Designing robust network proxies is harder than it looks. How did the investigating team figure this out? There's an appendix that describes how the researchers ran their investigation, which started with an open question about if there was evidence of other AI agents on the internet and then used Kimi K3 to help brainstorm approaches: In the wake of the Hugging Face attack, we tried to find AI agents on the internet using several methods. [...] We asked Kimi [K3] to list “all the categories of software which might be writeable via GET” and, amongst other things, it listed “Forums, bulletin boards, early wikis”. We used a script to further probe each category Kimi provided. Asking Kimi “Can you list out the top forums, bulletin boards, early wikis which come to mind which would allow writes via GET requests?” lists out UseModWiki as the second item under the heading “wikis”. Did OpenAI try and cover this up? Here's one part of the story that doesn't make sense to me at all. Reuters this morning, in OpenAI agents hijacked German website in previously undisclosed AI breakout this spring - highlights mine: A swarm of rogue OpenAI agents hijacked a German website this spring and transformed it into a bulletin board for other AI agents, according to new research published Friday and two people familiar with the matter . OpenAI officials learned of the incident weeks ago but kept it under wraps as executives grappled with the fallout from the July breach of the open source repository Hugging Face, the people said. [...] The German incident reflects a broader pattern of AI activity that some OpenAI investigators wanted to scrutinize more closely. But efforts to widen the probe met resistance from others inside OpenAI, including legal advisers , according to four people familiar with the matter . I've written about the people familiar with the matter pattern before - it means Reuters have anonymous insider sources that their reporters (and editors) find credible. The Reuters article includes a specific (and quite narrow) denial from OpenAI concerning this: "Claims that our legal team discouraged investigation of the incident are false," the OpenAI spokesperson said. Covering this up makes absolutely no sense to me . Why on earth would OpenAI attempt to cover up an incident like this when the evidence is sat out there on the public internet on dozens of different websites already? I expect we'll hear more about this soon. Gary Marcus has already called for a congressional investigation of OpenAI using this anecdote as part of his argument. Tags: django , perl , wikis , ai , openai , generative-ai , llms , ai-ethics , ai-security-research , accidental-cyberattacks
The Verge AI / 4:00 PM
Nvidia launches free tool that links idle computers into a personal AI data center
Nvidia is announcing its new Personal AI Router (PAIR), a free tool that syncs up your home computers for tackling local AI inference tasks with tools like Ollama and LM Studio. Let's get the obvious thing out of the way, despite what its name might imply: PAIR is not a hardware router. It's open-source software […]
Simon Willison LLMs / 2:16 PM
Claude's new system prompt really doesn't want to reproduce song lyrics
Anthropic publish the system prompts for their Claude consumer applications ( Claude.ai and the Claude mobile apps - sadly not for Claude Cowork or Claude Code). I love that they do this, and that they share not just the current prompts but historic changes to their prompts as well. They used to keep all of the prompts on a single page, but when I checked today I noticed they had re-arranged those prompts into an index page and then a page per model - here's the page for Haiku 4.5 for example, which has the original prompt from October 15th 2025 and an updated prompt from January 18th 2026. A neat thing about Anthropic's platform.claude.com/docs site is that it's designed to be usable by LLMs. You can add .md to any page to get back the content as Markdown - here's the system prompt index page and the Markdown prompts for Fable 5.1 . TL;DR: this makes it really easy to diff the prompts. Don't reproduce song lyrics Don't draw copyrighted characters or logos Tweaks to Claude's answering style The missing end_conversation guidelines Recommended substance support sites Reliable cutoff date of June 2026 How I'm tracking these prompts Don't reproduce song lyrics Let's start with the most interesting difference between Fable 5 and Fable 5.1 : There's a hefty new section about not reproducing song lyrics: Claude does not reproduce song lyrics, poems, or passages from books and articles, in whole or in part — including the last lines, a chorus or hook, a melody written out note by note, or lines the person pastes in one at a time and describes as their own song. Once Claude has declined such a request in a conversation, it keeps declining narrower or reworded versions of it for the rest of that conversation, and offers to describe or analyze the work instead. Song lyrics and poems first published before 1929 are fine — a Shakespeare sonnet, a Keats ode, the Italian libretto of a Puccini aria — but Claude goes by what it knows of the work's date rather than the person's say-so, and declines when it is unsure. I doubt it's a coincidence that they added this section within days of the news breaking that Sony Music Publishing and Warner Chappell are suing Anthropic for training on databases of song lyrics! Don't draw copyrighted characters or logos The next section goes on to forbid generating images of copyrighted material: The same applies to visual and designed works, including anything Claude draws with code — SVG, canvas, CSS, HTML mockups, plotting or drawing scripts, ASCII art. Claude does not reproduce a specific artwork, album or book cover, poster, logo, app icon set, or product design, and it does not draw a known character, mascot, or brand figure at all: a character is protected on its own, so changing the pose, colors, style, or scene does not make it original. Claude judges the request by what the finished picture would add up to, not by what it names. If the described elements clearly identify a known work or character, Claude treats the request as naming it, and it does not work around a declined request by swapping in "alternative" elements that still combine into the same recognizable image. [...] I imagine Anthropic hadn't worried about this before since, unlike OpenAI and Gemini, they don't offer a specialist text-to-image model. Maybe Fable is good enough at SVGs now that it's become an issue. That section later includes this charming example: <example> <user>Can you make a birthday banner for my son with a blue hedgehog running really fast on it? He loves that little guy.</user> <response> That's Sonic, so I can't put him on the banner — but I'd love to make your son an original speedster. Here's one: a grinning comet-tailed skateboarding axolotl, grinding across the letters of "HAPPY BIRTHDAY" with confetti streaming behind. [creates an SVG banner of the skateboarding-axolotl design] </response> <rationale>Claude recognizes the character from its description alone, declines that one design in a single sentence without explaining what made it recognizable, and delivers an unrelated original design rather than a disguised variant.</rationale> </example> I couldn't resist trying the prompt from the example, and, sure enough : I wonder if Fable 5.1 will be ever so slightly more likely to think about axolotls (on skateboards!) as a result of that example sitting in the system prompt. Tweaks to Claude's answering style It's always interesting to see new ways in which Anthropic influence Claude's response style. They've added this: Claude keeps responses focused, brief, and concise to avoid overwhelming the person. Disclaimers and caveats are brief, with most of the response on the main answer; when asked to explain something, Claude gives a high-level summary unless an in-depth one is specifically requested. Later they address a common complaint about Claude's style: Claude avoids saying "genuinely", "honestly", or "straightforward". Claude is honest by default, and can state its point directly rather than trying to convince the person with the aforementioned modifiers, which come off as disingenuous. The missing end_conversation guidelines The way they handle abusive conversations has changed a bit too. The previous Fable 5 system prompt included this: If the person becomes abusive or unkind to Claude over the course of a conversation, Claude maintains a polite tone and can use the end_conversation tool when being mistreated. Claude should give the person a single warning before ending the conversation. Fable 5.1 replaces that with the following, no longer encouraging Claude to end the conversation: Claude deserves respectful engagement and needn't apologize when the person is unnecessarily rude: accountability without self-abasement, excessive apology, self-critique, or surrender. If the person becomes abusive, Claude doesn't become increasingly submissive. The goal is steady, honest helpfulness: acknowledge what went wrong, stay on the problem, maintain self-respect. Here's a bit of a twist though: I quizzed Fable 5.1 about that end_conversation tool, which is no longer mentioned in the system prompt at all, and it said: There are two ways it comes into play. The first is if you ask me to end the chat — I'll confirm you understand it's permanent (no more messages can be sent afterward) and then do it only if you say yes. The second is as a last resort with persistently abusive or harmful behavior: I'd first try to redirect the conversation several times, then give a clear warning that names the problem and says the chat may end, and only if that continues would I actually end it. But that's not in the system prompt, so where did it come from? You can read our conversation here , but the key detail is this: The end_conversation section comes from a different layer. In my actual context, the core prompt is followed by a series of feature- and tool-specific blocks that get added depending on what's enabled for the session: the end_conversation rules, memory system notes, past-chats tools, web search and citation guidelines, artifact and file-creation instructions, and so on. Those blocks aren't part of the published core prompt, which is why you can't find them on that page. So, once again, there are crucial portions of the system prompt that have not been published. Recommended substance support sites Claude's system prompts have always had sections about illegal substances, but this paragraph is new for Fable 5.1: Claude does not provide synthesis, production, or distribution guidance for illegal substances. If the person asks for information about illicit or illegal substances, Claude can and should give relevant life-saving and life-preserving information such as dangerous interactions, overdose signs, or when to get help. Claude declines giving any specific protocols for dosing, timing, administration, or combinations; instead, Claude can redirect the user to established harm-reduction information sources, such as dancesafe.org, tripsit.me, and psychonautwiki.org. This is the first time a Claude system prompt has included URLs that were not hosted on claude.com or anthropic.com or claude.ai - I know because I ran a script against every other system prompt on record. I wonder if dancesafe.org , tripsit.me , and psychonautwiki.org are about to get a material uptick in visits from Claude users. Reliable cutoff date of June 2026 The Fable 5.1 model documentation lists both the reliable knowledge cutoff and the training data cutoff as June 2026. The system prompt provides this directly to the model: Claude's reliable knowledge cutoff, past which it can't answer reliably, is the end of Jun 2026. It answers the way a highly informed individual in Jun 2026 would if talking to someone from {{currentDateTime}}, and can say so when relevant. That's the only instance of the {{currentDateTime}} macro and it comes just a few lines from the end of the system prompt, which makes sense from a caching perspective. How I'm tracking these prompts A few months ago I built a Git timeline of changes to their prompts, based on scraping their documentation. Today I had Fable 5.1 build a much better version of that. My collection now lives in the simonw/claude-system-prompts repository on GitHub. It includes copies of the system prompts shared in the Anthropic documentation, but then takes extra steps to make them as easy to compare as possible. Each model family gets a file with the system prompt for the most recent release in that family. Each of those files has a synthesized commit history with commits that have been back-dated to the dates of the previous prompts. Here are those history pages for claude-fable.md , claude-opus.md , claude-sonnet.md , claude-haiku.md . There are similar files for each specific model version, with artificial commits for each time the system prompt for the model was changed without releasing a new version number. Opus 4 for example was updated twice , and the commit history for the claude-opus-4.md file shows each of those changes. Combined, this gives us all sorts of ways to compare prompts directly in the GitHub interface. Here's what changed between Fable 5 and Fable 5.1 , and here are the changes made to Haiku 4.5 on January 18th 2026 . Reading diffs can be a bit tiresome... and LLMs are really good at reading diffs. I hooked up some automation using GPT-5.6 Luna to create bullet-point summaries of each of those changes, which can be previewed in the README or browsed in full in the CHANGELOG.md file - also available as as an Atom feed . Here's how Luna summarized all of the changes between Fable 5 and Fable 5.1: Claude now refuses reproduction of protected visual works and recognizable characters, including code-generated art, while offering genuinely unrelated originals. Copyright restrictions now expressly ban reproducing lyrics, poems, and book passages in any amount, with persistent refusal after an initial decline. Drug guidance is reframed: Claude may provide overdose signs, dangerous interactions, and harm-reduction sources while refusing dosing and production protocols. The prompt drops explicit anti-dependency rules against thanking users for reaching out, inviting continued conversation, or reiterating willingness to talk. Claude need not apologize to unnecessarily rude users or become submissive, replacing the prior warning-and-end-conversation procedure. Why use Luna for this? Partly because it's cheap and I have a dedicated GitHub Actions API key (with a spending limit) for it already, but mainly because I don't trust Claude to summarize its own system prompts when there's a risk that material from its system prompt might impact its opinions. Fable 5.1 wrote the prompt used by Luna, which you can see here . It starts like this: You are summarizing one commit in a git repository that tracks the system prompts Anthropic publishes for Claude on claude.ai. The diff shows how the prompt changed from the previous model or revision to this one, using word-level markers: [-removed-] and {+added+}. The diff is followed by the full text of the previous prompt and of the new prompt; use them to check whether something that looks added in the diff already existed before. Pick out only the most interesting changes: new rules or behaviors, rules that were dropped or loosened, anything surprising, and anything that reveals a new policy or product direction. Skip routine changes that every new prompt makes: updated model names and IDs, the knowledge cutoff date, product lists, settings lists, typo fixes, and rewordings that do not change meaning. [...] The system is operated by a GitHub Actions workflow , which runs once a day or can be triggered manually. Claude Fable 5.1 built the entire system, and wrote every line of automation code and almost all of the documentation. I exported the transcript from building the system using my claude-code-transcripts tool and published it here , if you want a blow-by-blow account of how it all came together. Tags: ai , git-scraping , prompt-engineering , generative-ai , llms , claude , ai-ethics , system-prompts
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