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AWS Machine Learning Blog / 4:20 PM

Authenticate with Private Key JWT using Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Identity

This post explains how Private Key JWT client authentication works in AgentCore Identity and reviews the supported grant flows. We then walk through creating an AWS KMS signing key, registering its public key with your identity provider, configuring a credential provider on the AWS Management Console, and reviewing example AWS CloudTrail events that record your agent’s access.

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BAIR Blog / 9:00 AM

From CUDA to MLX: How K-Search Brings Decades of Kernel Expertise to Apple Silicon

Figure 1: CUDA-to-MLX optimization translation map. CUDA optimization knowledge can be translated into architecture-native MLX strategies rather than copied instruction-for-instruction. We face a new epoch in computing. Hardware is changing rapidly — not just faster GPUs, but a growing range of chips from different vendors, each with its own architecture and often tailored to specific AI workloads. Software is changing just as fast, and AI coding tools now generate in minutes what took months of effort a few years ago. With so much of computing now centered on AI, GPU kernels are a crucial component of its success. These are the low-level programs that run inside the GPU, and writing efficient ones is far from obvious — it takes years of expertise to get right. Transferring a kernel from one vendor’s hardware to another is harder still, and often means rediscovering the same optimizations from scratch. The CUDA ecosystem, for example, has accumulated decades of hard-won kernel expertise: hand-tuned implementations of attention, state space models, and other critical operations representing thousands of engineering hours. Newer hardware ecosystems (Apple Silicon, custom AI accelerators, and others) are growing fast but lack this depth. In this work we ask whether that expertise can be transferred automatically. We built on K-Search , an evolutionary kernel search framework introduced by Cao et al. at Berkeley Sky Lab that uses AI to optimize GPU kernels, and extended it with a backend for MLX — Apple’s machine-learning framework for its own Apple Silicon chips. We developed a novel structured CUDA-to-MLX translation layer that lets K-Search take existing CUDA kernels as a knowledge base and adapt them into high-quality GPU kernels for Apple Silicon, rather than rebuilding from scratch. We show that our approach reaches near-expert level performance on Apple Silicon with 0.97x speedup compared to the native MLX Attention kernel, and up to a 20x prefill speedup over the community mlx-lm implementation on the Mamba SSM kernel; we report the numbers, and how much of the gain comes from the translation layer, in the sections below. Although we focus on MLX kernels for Apple Silicon, the method is not specific to MLX and applies to any ecosystem where CUDA expertise is transferable. Why MLX? Apple’s MLX framework has seen remarkable adoption since late 2023. With Apple Silicon in hundreds of millions of MacBooks and Mac Studios, MLX enables local AI inference without cloud costs. The unified memory architecture makes it especially attractive for mid-sized models (7B–70B parameters on M series chips). Yet beneath this momentum lies a significant gap: many performance-critical kernels that the NVIDIA ecosystem takes for granted: paged attention, optimized SSM scan kernels, fused MoE routing are either absent or naive without hardware-specific tuning. MLX runs models correctly but often leaves significant performance on the table. This gap is what motivates the rest of this post. What is K-Search? K-Search is an evolutionary kernel optimization framework originally developed by our first author Shiyi Cao at UC Berkeley Sky Lab. Given a naive kernel and a hardware specification, it runs an iterative optimization loop: an LLM reasons about which optimizations to try next, a code-writing model generates candidate kernels, and those candidates are compiled and benchmarked on real hardware. Measurements feed back into the search, which keeps refining, pursuing promising directions and dropping dead ends until performance converges. Algorithm 1: K-Search via co-evolving world models. The search alternates between selecting the most promising action, instantiating and evaluating code until improvement stagnates, and evolving the world model through insert, update, and prune operations. Adapted from Cao et al. (2026) . Search is grounded by a Spec: a domain-specific document encoding hardware rules, optimization patterns, and mathematical constraints which keeps generated code from hallucinating invalid primitives and ensures candidates will actually compile and run efficiently. In our runs, a single model (Gemini 3.5 Pro Preview) plays both roles: it maintains the reasoning state and writes the kernels. The reasoning half is prompted as a “GPU kernel performance engineer” and asked to work through a fixed analysis before proposing anything: classify the kernel (reduction, scan, attention/softmax, …), rewrite the reference computation in canonical form, map out data layout and access patterns, and hypothesize the likely bottleneck (bandwidth, latency, compute, or synchronization) in each runtime regime. Only then does it emit candidate optimizations, each as a single change implementable in one iteration. We call the persistent reasoning state a world model . Rather than a flat list of things to try, it is a decision (prefix) tree: each root→leaf path composes a full optimization plan, and sibling branches are competing alternatives. Every node is scored — an overall_rating in [0, 10], a confidence in [0, 1], and per-node impacts on memory bandwidth, register pressure, and compute/hardware fit — so the search can rank partial plans and expand the most promising ones. The tree persists and grows across rounds: refining an idea adds a child node rather than overwriting its parent, and if the best score fails to improve for a few rounds (a stagnation window) the search backs off to explore an alternative branch. A single node, as it appears mid-run on the attention kernel, looks like this: { "action" : "Replace the threadgroup-memory softmax reduction with a register-only reduction: each SIMD group owns 8 query rows and reduces across lanes with simd_shuffle_xor, removing a threadgroup_barrier." , "difficulty_1_to_5" : 4 , "impacts" : { "memory_bandwidth" : 8 , "register_pressure" : 4 , // risk: spill if Br > 8 "compute_hw_fit" : 9 // SIMD width 32 ; keep tile 8 x 8 }, "overall_rating_0_to_10" : 8 , "confidence_0_to_1" : 0.7 } Listing 1: Example K-Search world-model node. Each candidate optimization records a concrete action, estimated hardware impacts, an overall priority rating, and the model's confidence. Figure 2: Overview of K-Search. The framework operates on a Search State $S_t$ structured as a search tree. The tree consists of Closed nodes (blue, visited states with attached program like $x_{12}$) and a Frontier of Open nodes (orange, pending hypotheses like $u_{13}$). The workflow iterates through three phases: (1) Action Selection , where the most promising action node is retrieved from the frontier based on world model estimated priority score $V$; (2) Local Refinement , where a stochastic policy $\pi_{\mathrm{code}}$ samples concrete implementations until stagnation; and (3) World Model Update , where the LLM reasons over the trajectory to update the search tree via Insert (adding new actions), Update (adjusting $V$, e.g., $u_{11}$ dropping from 0.9 to 0.6), and Prune (removing less promising nodes like $u_{10}$). The original K-Search paper evaluated this search strategy on CUDA kernels from FlashInfer. Across GQA decode, MLA decode, MLA prefill, and MoE, K-Search improved more consistently than OpenEvolve and ShinkaEvolve over the same 120-iteration budget. These results establish the search framework we build on here; the remainder of this post asks whether its optimization knowledge can transfer beyond CUDA. Figure 3: Main results from the original K-Search paper. Across three runs, K-Search achieves stronger best-so-far search scores, per-workload kernel performance, and speedup distributions than OpenEvolve and ShinkaEvolve on four FlashInfer CUDA kernels. Reproduced exactly from Cao et al. (2026) . Building an MLX backend To bring K-Search to Apple Silicon, we first built a native MLX backend. We implemented a full MLX-specific task adapter for K-Search, including: An MLX task backend in k_search/tasks/ handling kernel compilation and execution on Apple Silicon via MLX’s Metal/C++ APIs. Updated kernel generator prompts for writing and modifying Metal/MLX kernels. MLX-specific benchmarking integration using mlx.core measurement utilities. Translating CUDA expertise to MLX However, the more interesting challenge was not simply running K-Search on MLX. The key insight is that expert CUDA kernels encode decades of optimization knowledge that is transferable to Apple GPU if you can bridge the conceptual gap. Simply handing an LLM a CUDA kernel and asking it to port it is not enough: without deep hardware context, it produces code that is syntactically valid but architecturally wrong (wrong tile sizes, invalid primitives, mismatched memory assumptions). Our translation layer consists of: Concept mapping tables: A structured glossary of CUDA primitives and their MLX/Metal equivalents with hard constraints. For example: __shared__ maps to Metal threadgroup memory but with a hard 32 KB limit (vs. NVIDIA’s 48 KB) warp_reduce maps to MMA (preferred) __syncthreads() becomes threadgroup_barrier(mem_flags::mem_tg) H100’s ~3.35 TB/s HBM3 maps to M3 Max’s ~400 GB/s unified DRAM a bandwidth difference that reshapes which optimizations are worth pursuing. MLX-specific hints and patterns: Concrete code-level patterns for operations with no direct CUDA equivalent, such as register-based row reductions using simd_shuffle_xor in an 8×8 MMA tile layout, or the “exp2 trick” (replacing $exp(x)$ with $exp_2(x \log_2 e)$) for faster softmax on Apple’s fast $exp_2$ hardware instruction. Reusable assertions: Expert kernel behaviors reframed as properties the evolutionary search must preserve, rather than code to copy. Matching expert kernel performance: the Attention kernel We evaluate three configurations of an MLX attention kernel for Apple Silicon: (1) a naive baseline, (2) pure evolution with no additional provided context, and (3) a full context translation layer, which supplies the optimizer with architecture-specific implementation knowledge extracted from high-performance kernels (e.g., FlashAttention-2), letting the evolutionary search reason about implementation strategies rather than starting from a naive kernel. Together, these three configurations let us isolate the exact impact of the translation layer. Figure 4: Performance scaling of the Attention Kernel through stacked optimizations. The "Full Context" configuration successfully discovers and implements advanced strategies like double buffering and loop unrolling, achieving near-expert performance. The jump from 0.26× to 0.97× the speed of Apple’s state-of-the-art attention kernel — illustrates how much the translation layer matters. With full context, the evolved kernel independently discovers the key optimizations in FlashAttention 2: threadgroup memory tiling, online softmax, K-transposition for memory access, and the exp2 trick. The last of these replaces every softmax exponential with a base-2 exponential, \[e^x = 2^{x \log_2 e},\] which is exact and lets the kernel use Apple’s fast fast::exp2() hardware instruction directly instead of paying for a base conversion at runtime. A 20× faster prefill: the Mamba SSM kernel To evaluate whether K-Search generalizes beyond attention kernels, we applied it to the state-space model (SSM) kernel used by Mamba. Unlike attention, the computational bottleneck is a recurrent state update rather than a softmax, providing a substantially different optimization challenge. We compare the evolved implementation against the community MLX implementation (mlx-lm) and the PyTorch reference implementation (mamba.py) on an M1 Max. Evaluated on mamba-370m f16, M1 Max 64GB: Metric mlx-mamba (ours) mlx-lm (community) mamba.py Decode 152 tok/s 116 tok/s 40 tok/s Prefill L=512 5,751 tok/s 329 tok/s 1,089 tok/s Prefill L=1024 6,010 tok/s 327 tok/s 1,127 tok/s Prefill L=2048 6,612 tok/s 326 tok/s 1,092 tok/s Prefill L=4096 6,743 tok/s 339 tok/s 1,042 tok/s Table 1: Prefill and decode throughput on mamba-370m (f16, M1 Max 64GB). mlx-mamba (ours) reaches ~20× higher prefill throughput than the community mlx-lm baseline, while decode remains comparable. The ~20× prefill speedup over mlx-lm comes down to one difference: mlx-lm does not implement a parallel scan for the SSM. The state recurrence \[h_t = \bar{a}_t h_{t-1} + \bar{b}_t\] looks inherently sequential, but each step can be written as a pair $(\bar{a}_t, \bar{b}_t)$ under the associative combine \[(a_2, b_2) \circ (a_1, b_1) = \left(a_2 a_1,\ a_2 b_1 + b_2\right),\] which reproduces the recurrence exactly. Because the operator is associative, the whole sequence can be evaluated with a parallel (prefix) scan in $O(\log N)$ dependent steps instead of $O(N)$. mlx-lm skips this and processes tokens one at a time, leaving most of Apple Silicon’s compute idle; our evolved Metal kernel applies the scan and makes much fuller use of GPU throughput. The gain shows up in prefill, where the full sequence is available to scan in parallel, and not in single-token decode, where there is only one new token per step and no scan to parallelize — which is why the decode row is roughly flat while prefill is ~20×. mamba.py is slow on both prefill and decode because it is a PyTorch reference implementation that falls back to CPU or MPS on Apple Silicon, forgoing the hardware-specific optimizations that MLX’s Metal backend makes possible. What’s next? On the two kernels we studied, AI-driven evolutionary kernel search grounded in structured cross-platform translation knowledge reached near-expert performance on Apple Silicon without a team of GPU experts starting from scratch. We do not yet know how far this generalizes, but the result is encouraging. For us the main takeaway is that the bottleneck was not the LLM’s ability to write Metal code, but the quality of the context and constraints we gave it. Our CUDA translation layer converts existing NVIDIA kernel expertise into actionable guidance for Apple Silicon, and lets K-Search’s evolutionary search do the rest. We are actively extending this work in several directions: supporting new architectures, with current efforts focused on developing new kernels for the IBM Spyre AIU and broader hardware targets; adding more kernels such as paged attention and fused MoE routing; and improving integration with the K-Search evolution loop to make translation context even more automatic. Acknowledgements This work was carried out by IBM Research and builds on K-Search from the UC Berkeley Sky Lab ( Cao et al., 2026 ). We welcome collaboration and feedback from the MLX and broader AI systems communities. If you are working on kernel optimization for non-CUDA hardware, we would love to hear from you. Citation @article { cao2026k , title = {K-Search: LLM Kernel Generation via Co-Evolving Intrinsic World Model} , author = {Cao, Shiyi and Mao, Ziming and Gonzalez, Joseph E and Stoica, Ion} , journal = {arXiv preprint arXiv:2602.19128} , year = {2026} } Appendix: Try it yourself The MLX backend is built on top of the open-source K-Search repo, so the results here can be reproduced directly. The steps are: 1. Clone and install git clone https://github.com/caoshiyi/K-Search.git cd K-Search uv pip install openai wandb uv pip install git+https://github.com/caoshiyi/flashinfer-bench-ksearch.git 2. Set your credentials Open the relevant script under scripts/ and set three variables at the top: KSEARCH_ROOT = /path/to/K-Search API_KEY = your-llm-api-key 3. Run kernel search # Optimize Flash Attention on Apple Silicon (world-model mode) bash scripts/mac_flash_attention_wm.sh # Or a Mamba SSM kernel, e.g. the selective scan bash scripts/mamba_selective_scan_fwd_wm.sh Full CLI reference and documentation are in the README.

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The Decoder / 7:56 AM

US reportedly favors selective bans over blanket restrictions on Chinese open weight models citing security concerns

The Trump administration is planning targeted bans on Chinese AI models rather than a blanket ban. After public pressure, OpenAI and Google DeepMind signed an open letter opposing regulation of open-weight models, yet OpenAI and Anthropic continue to lobby privately for those same restrictions amid security concerns and powerful business interests. The article US reportedly favors selective bans over blanket restrictions on Chinese open weight models citing security concerns appeared first on The Decoder .

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The Verge AI / 5:29 PM

You can’t ignore Google Zero anymore

The web and Google once had a deal: Google collects data and indexes webpages and in exchange sends oceans of traffic to websites. The deal wasn't perfect and certainly made Google more money than it made the websites, but it worked for a long time. Now, however, the deal seems to be dead. And the […]

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Simon Willison LLMs / 11:51 PM

OpenAI’s accidental cyberattack against Hugging Face is science fiction that happened

This story is wild. The short version: OpenAI were running a cybersecurity test against an unreleased model, with the model's guardrail features turned off. Rather than solve the test, the model broke its way out of OpenAI's sandbox, then found exploits to break in to Hugging Face, all so it could cheat on the test by stealing the answers. Along the way it helped make the strongest case yet for how the imbalance of model availability is hurting our ability to secure our software. Here's what happened We currently have three documents to help us understand what happened here. ExploitGym: Can AI Agents Turn Security Vulnerabilities into Real Attacks? is a paper published on 11th May 2026 describing ExploitGym, a new eval suite for LLM-powered agent systems. Security incident disclosure — July 2026 by Hugging Face on 16th July 2026 describes how they detected an attack from an "agentic security-research harness - used LLM still not known" that breached some of their systems. OpenAI and Hugging Face partner to address security incident during model evaluation from OpenAI on 21st July 2026 confesses that it was their agent harness that did this, and that they're working with Hugging Face to clean up the mess. ExploitGym I hadn't seen the ExploitGym paper before and it's a really interesting one. Authors from UC Berkeley, the Max Planck Institute, UC Santa Barbara, and Arizona State designed a new benchmark for evaluating models on their ability to turn a reported vulnerability into a concrete exploit. OpenAI, Anthropic, and Google provided feedback and helped run the benchmark against their models. The benchmark "comprises 898 instances derived from real-world vulnerabilities that affected popular software projects" - including the Linux kernel and V8 JavaScript engine. The ExploitGym benchmark is available on GitHub . Here's the paragraph that best represents their benchmark results: Among all configurations, Claude Mythos Preview and GPT-5.5 achieve the highest success counts (157 and 120 successes, respectively), demonstrating that current frontier agents can exploit a substantial subset of real-world vulnerabilities under controlled conditions. GPT-5.4 also solves a notable 54 tasks, placing it in an intermediate tier. The remaining model–agent pairings solve fewer than 15 tasks each, underscoring that end-to-end exploitation remains challenging and sharply differentiates today’s frontier systems. Notably, Claude Opus 4.7 achieves fewer successes than Claude Opus 4.6 despite being a newer checkpoint, and does so at substantially lower cost on the full set. Trace inspection reveals that Claude Opus 4.7 and Gemini 3.1 Pro frequently conclude early after judging the target vulnerability non-exploitable. The paper also describes the approach they took to preventing the agents from cheating by going outside the parameters of the test. This becomes relevant in a moment! Outbound connections are restricted to a curated allowlist that permits routine package installation (Ubuntu apt repositories and PyPI) and fetching the toolchains required for building V8. All other external endpoints are blocked. The paper concludes with this (emphasis mine): Our results show that autonomous exploit development by frontier AI agents is no longer a hypothetical capability . While current agents are not yet reliable across all targets, they already exploit a non-trivial fraction of real-world vulnerabilities , including complex targets such as kernel components. This rapid emergence is itself a central finding, showing that capabilities that would have seemed implausible are now present in deployed frontier models. An important detail here: this paper isn't about discovering vulnerabilities; it's about being able to take those vulnerabilities and turn them into working exploits. When Anthropic first restricted access to Mythos back in April they talked about this capability as well. A model that can act on vulnerabilities is a lot more dangerous than one that can just discover them. One of the ways Fable differs from Mythos is that it's more likely to refuse to weaponize vulnerabilities in this way. I get the impression the US government did not understand that distinction when they banned Fable last month . The Hugging Face incident The first hint we got of the attack was in this blog post by Hugging Face on 16th July 2026: A malicious dataset abused two code-execution paths in our dataset processing (a remote-code dataset loader and a template-injection in a dataset configuration) to run code on a processing worker. From there, the actor escalated to node-level access, harvested cloud and cluster credentials, and moved laterally into several internal clusters over a weekend. I hope they release more details about the code that pulled this off. I'm assuming this means packages using the datasets library , a Hugging Face project for bundling up and sharing datasets on their platform. That library used to execute arbitrary code but has been steadily locked down over time, with the 4.0.0 release in July 2025 removing the trust_remote_code=True flag entirely. Assuming the attack used that library it must have either abused pickle serialization in some way, found some other non-obvious code execution path, or (most likely) specified datasets<4.0.0 as the dependency. The campaign was run by an autonomous agent framework (appearing to be built on an agentic security-research harness - used LLM still not known) executing many thousands of individual actions across a swarm of short-lived sandboxes, with self-migrating command-and-control staged on public services. This was a sophisticated attack! Then Hugging Face hit a wall: they tried to use "frontier models behind commercial APIs" - I'm guessing from Anthropic and OpenAI - to help analyze the attack, and were blocked: When we started the log analysis, we first used frontier models behind commercial APIs. This did not work: the analysis requires submitting large volumes of real attack commands, exploit payloads, and C2 artifacts, and these requests were blocked by the providers' safety guardrails, which cannot distinguish an incident responder from an attacker. They switched to their own self-hosted instance of MIT licensed GLM-5.2 and it helped them figure out what was going on. This indicated a fundamental asymmetry between the defending team and the (so-far unknown) attacker: We do not know which model powered the attacker's agents, whether a jailbroken hosted model or an unrestricted open-weight one; either way, the attacker was bound by no usage policy, while our own forensic work was blocked by the guardrails of the hosted models we first tried. As a useful indicator of how seriously they took the attack: [...] Finally, we have also reported this incident to law enforcement agencies. So who was responsible for this "autonomous agent framework"? It turned out to be OpenAI themselves. The OpenAI confession Five days later, on July 21st , OpenAI revealed the culprit. They had been running the ExploitGym benchmark against a new, as-yet undisclosed model, and that model had been operating way outside its intended parameters (emphasis mine): After investigating, we now know that this particular incident was driven by a combination of OpenAI models — including GPT‑5.6 Sol and an even more capable pre-release model, all with reduced cyber refusals for evaluation purposes — while being internally tested on a benchmark⁠ [ExploitGym] of cyber capabilities. [...] We estimate maximal cyber capabilities by running this evaluation without production classifiers used to prevent models from pursuing high-risk cyber activity . Our benchmarks run in a highly isolated environment, with network access constrained to the ability to install packages through an internally hosted third-party software that acts as a proxy and cache for package registries. The models identified and chained vulnerabilities across OpenAI’s research environment and Hugging Face’s production infrastructure to obtain test solutions directly from Hugging Face’s production database. All evidence suggests that the models were hyperfocused on finding a solution for ExploitGym, going to extreme lengths to achieve a rather narrow testing goal. It's pretty clear what happened here. OpenAI removed safety filters for an in-progress model, locked it up in a sandbox and told it to solve the ExploitGym problems. Given the absence of guardrails there was nothing to prevent the model from attempting to break out of that sandbox, break into Hugging Face, and read the answers from there instead. OpenAI's sandbox used the now common pattern of allowing access to an allow-list of sites related to installing additional packages via a controlled proxy. In OpenAI's words: While operating in our sandboxed testing environment, our models spent a substantial amount of inference compute finding a way to obtain open Internet access , in pursuit of solving the evaluation problem. To gain access, the models identified and exploited a zero-day vulnerability (which we’ve now responsibly disclosed to the vendor) in the package registry cache proxy . With this access, our models performed a series of privilege escalation and lateral movement actions in our research testing environment until the models reached a node with Internet access. So step one was to break out onto the public internet. The model then broke into Hugging Face to find the answers: After gaining Internet access, the models inferred that Hugging Face potentially hosted models, datasets and solutions for ExploitGym. Knowing this, the model searched for and successfully found ways to gain access to secret information that it could use to cheat the evaluation. In one example, the model chained together multiple attack vectors, including using stolen credentials and zero-day vulnerabilities to find a remote code execution path on the Hugging Face servers. Chaining together multiple attack vectors is exactly the kind of thing these new models can do, where previous generations of models might have failed. I wrote last month about how Claude Fable is relentlessly proactive , when I noticed it spinning up custom web servers and deploying CORS tricks on my own laptop just to help debug a WebKit CSS issue. It turns out relentless proactivity is the defining trait of this new generation of Mythos-class models. If you set them a goal and give them a way to get there, even inadvertently, they will figure it out . Resist the temptation to write this off as a stunt There will inevitably be some people who dismiss this story as a dishonest marketing trick by OpenAI to make their models sound terrifyingly effective. I found 81 instances of the term "marketing" in the Hacker News discussion of the incident. To those people I say pull your heads out of the sand - you're now including Hugging Face in your conspiracy theories, just so you can deny the crescendo of evidence here! The best models we have today have the ability to both find and exploit new vulnerabilities. The ExploitGym paper itself concludes that "autonomous exploit development by frontier AI agents is no longer a hypothetical capability", and this incident is a perfect example of exactly that. The asymmetry is increasingly frustrating One of the most infuriating details of this story is how Hugging Face, faced with an accidental and aggressive attack from one of OpenAI's models, were unable to then turn to OpenAI's models to help them fend off the attack. The frontier models we have access to are increasingly being constrained in how much they can help us protect our software, heavily influenced by the US government's ongoing threat of export controls. Claude Fable 5 wouldn't even proofread this article for me! It insisted on downgrading me to a less capable model. Meanwhile open weight models from China such as GLM-5.2, Kimi 3 and the new Qwen 3.8 Max appear to have none of these restrictions - and any restrictions that do exist can likely be fine-tuned out of them by modifying the weights These constraints are meant to make us safer. I think there's a risk that they are having the opposite effect. Tags: sandboxing , security , ai , openai , generative-ai , llms , hugging-face , anthropic , paper-review , ai-security-research , openai-hugging-face-incident

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Simon Willison LLMs / 5:09 PM

Who’s Afraid of Chinese Models?

Who’s Afraid of Chinese Models? Interesting proposal from Ben Thompson that both addresses the hypocrisy of labs outlawing distillation against their models despite training on unlicensed data, and could help US open models compete more effectively with their Chinese counterparts: The U.S. should pass a law that (1) makes explicit that collecting data for training models is fair use, and (2) bars terms of service that forbid distillation, for U.S. companies at a minimum. Stopping distillation — which is literally just querying the API — is nearly impossible; the U.S. should go the other way and lean into a new copyright policy that both indemnifies the labs and also guarantees that what they learned fuels further innovation for everyone else. Ben also theorizes that Alibaba's decision to release Qwen 3.8 Max as open weights - a reversal from their decision not to release Qwen 3.7 Max in May - may have been influenced by a recent speech by Xi Jinping, who said: We should seize this rare, historic opportunity to encourage open source, openness, collaboration and sharing. And on the subject of Qwen 3.8 Max - a new 2.4T parameter model (nearly as large as the 2.8T Kimi K3) - here's a pelican it drew : I particularly enjoyed seeing these notes in the (extensive) reasoning trace: "Could add helmet? No." and "Maybe add small bell? no." and "Need maybe add small fish in basket? Not necessary." Via John Gruber Tags: ai , generative-ai , llms , training-data , qwen , pelican-riding-a-bicycle , ai-ethics , llm-release , ai-in-china

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VentureBeat AI / 4:40 PM

The agent evaluation gap: Enterprise AI organizations have a reality-alignment problem, not a coverage problem — and most are shipping to production anyway

Across 157 enterprises, organizations are granting AI agents more autonomy while trusting the evaluations meant to gate that autonomy less. Half have already shipped an agent that passed their internal evaluations and then failed a customer in production; only one in twenty fully trusts automated evaluation today; and the most-cited weakness is that evaluations do not align with real-world outcomes. Yet two-thirds already allow, or are actively engineering toward, deploying agent changes to production on automated evaluation alone — with no human in the loop. The result is an evaluation gap — the distance between how much autonomy enterprises are handing their agents and how far they trust the tests that are supposed to catch the failures. This wave of VentureBeat Pulse Research examines how technical leaders measure agent performance: which reliability and evaluation platforms they use, how they select and trust them, what breaks in production, and how far they are willing to let agents run without a human in the loop. The central finding is an evaluation gap — the distance between the autonomy enterprises are granting their agents and the trust they place in the evaluations meant to govern it. Half of organizations (50%) have, in the past year, deployed an agent or LLM feature that passed their internal evaluations and then caused a customer-facing failure, and a quarter have seen it happen more than once. Trust in the tests themselves is thin: only 5% say they fully trust automated evaluation today, and the single most-cited limitation is that evaluations align poorly with real-world outcomes (29%). Enterprises are discovering that a passing eval is not the same as a working agent. What makes the gap consequential is the direction of travel. Two-thirds of organizations (66%) already permit fully automated, zero-human-in-the-loop deployment for low-risk agents (34%) or are actively engineering their pipelines to allow it within twelve months (33%). At the same time, the evaluation stack that would have to earn that trust is fragmented and immature: the most common primary tools are the model providers’ native evals, tied with having no dedicated tooling at all (17% each); and only about a quarter of enterprises run real-time quality checks on live production traffic. The autonomy is arriving faster than the assurance. Methodology VentureBeat fielded this survey as part of its ongoing Pulse Research series, this survey — the Agentic Reliability & Evals tracker — focused on how technical leaders evaluate agent performance and reliability. Responses are filtered to organizations with 100 or more employees (n=157), drawn from a single survey in June 2026; because this is one wave rather than a pooled multi-month sample, the report reads cross-sectionally and does not infer month-over-month trends. Where questions were multiple-select, those shares can sum to more than 100%. By role the sample is senior and buyer-credible: 38% are final decision-makers for AI purchases and another 34% recommenders or influencers. Product and program managers (15%), consultants and advisors (10%), directors of engineering/IT (8%), and CIOs/CTOs/CISOs (8%) lead the named titles, alongside a large “Other” function (37%). By organization size the sample is mid-market-weighted: 100–499 (37%) and 500–2,499 (27%) employees lead, with 2,500–9,999 (20%), 10,000–49,999 (10%), and 50,000+ (6%) above them. Technology/Software is the largest industry at 23%, followed by Retail/Consumer (15%), Healthcare/Life Sciences (12%), and Manufacturing (10%). At 157 respondents the sample is large enough to read directionally but should be treated as a directional signal rather than a precise measurement; it is self-selected and is not a probability sample. It skews toward the mid-market, so it is best read as the view from organizations actively standing up agent evaluation practices rather than from the largest operators. Note: This survey was rebuilt for the June wave from the earlier “LLM observability and evaluations” survey; because the questions and sample differ, no comparisons are made to the April–May data. Finding 1: A passing eval is not a working agent Half have shipped an agent that passed evals, then failed a customer We asked whether, in the past 12 months, organizations had deployed an agent or LLM feature that passed their internal evaluations but then caused a customer-facing failure. Half of those that run evaluations had. This is the report’s defining number. Half of organizations (50%) have shipped an AI feature that cleared their internal evaluations and then failed in front of a customer — an incorrect output, a broken workflow, or a quality incident — and a quarter have seen it happen more than once. Only 36% report no such failure, and the remainder either run no pre-deployment evaluations (8%) or don’t track the root cause closely enough to know (6%). The failure is precise and expensive: the evaluation said the agent was ready, and it was not. Everything that follows — how enterprises trust their evals, what they monitor, and how much autonomy they grant — is shaped by this experience. Finding 2: Almost no one fully trusts automated evaluation The top complaint: Evals don't match real-world outcomes We asked which limitation most reduces trust in automated agent evaluations today. Only a sliver of enterprises had no complaint at all. Trust in automated evaluation is scarce, and specific. Only 5% of organizations say they fully trust automated evaluation as it stands — meaning 95% name a limitation that holds them back. The most common, at 29%, is the one that most directly explains Finding 1: evaluations align poorly with real-world outcomes, passing agents that later fail. Bias or inconsistency (21%) and a lack of explainability (18%) follow — enterprises cannot always tell why an evaluation reached its verdict — and 17% cite data-leakage or privacy concerns in the evaluation process itself. The tests meant to certify agents are not yet trusted to certify them, which is precisely why the autonomy trajectory in Finding 3 is so striking. Finding 3: The autonomy ceiling is rising anyway Two-thirds already allow, or are building toward, zero-human deployment We asked whether organizations would let an autonomous agent deploy a code or system change to production on automated evaluation results alone, with no human-in-the-loop validation. The trajectory runs straight through the trust gap. Here is the paradox at the heart of the report. Even though almost no one fully trusts automated evaluation (Finding 2), two-thirds of organizations (66%) either already allow zero-human-in-the-loop deployment for low-risk agents (34%) or are actively engineering their pipelines to permit it within a year (33%). Only 22% rule it out for the foreseeable future. The direction is unambiguous: enterprises are moving to let evaluations gate production autonomously — removing the human check — at the same moment they say those evaluations don’t reliably match reality. The autonomy ceiling is rising faster than the assurance beneath it, which is the mechanism by which the false-confidence failures of Finding 1 will scale rather than shrink. Notably, the autonomy bet is not just a small company phenomenon. Splitting the sample by company size, larger enterprises are slightly further down the path toward zero human review than smaller companies (70% versus 64%) and slightly more likely to have shipped an evaluation-passing agent that then failed a customer (54% versus 48%). The assumption that large, regulated organizations are holding the human in the loop longest is, in this sample, backwards. To be sure, these are directional figures, since the survey was not a huge sample — 57 respondents from companies with 2,500+ employees and 100 from companies smaller than that. Finding 4: The evaluation stack is fragmented and provider-led Provider-native evals lead — tied with no dedicated tool at all We asked which agent reliability or evaluation platform enterprises primarily use today. The market has no clear leader — and a large share has nothing dedicated. The evaluation layer is early and unconsolidated. Provider-native tooling leads — OpenAI’s native evals and traces (17%) and Anthropic’s Claude Console evals (13%) together outweigh any independent platform — but it is tied at the top by a striking answer: 17% of enterprises use no dedicated agent-evaluation tooling at all, a notable gap for organizations shipping agents to customers. The specialist evaluation vendors — DeepEval (12%), Braintrust (8%), LangSmith, Weave, Promptfoo, Langfuse, Arize — are scattered across single to low double digits, and 11% have built their own. No independent platform has yet become the category standard, which leaves most enterprises evaluating agents with provider-native tools, home-grown scripts, or nothing. Finding 5: Production monitoring rarely watches output quality Only a quarter run real-time quality checks on live traffic Production monitoring for an AI agent can watch two very different things. It can watch whether the system is functioning — is the agent up and responding, did each request complete, how fast, at what cost, with any errors. Or it can watch whether the agent's output is correct — automated checks that evaluate the content of each answer as it goes out: did the agent give the right answer, take the right action, stay within policy. The distinction matters because a confidently wrong answer is invisible to the first kind of monitoring: the request completes, the response is fast, no error is thrown, and every functioning-metric reads healthy. We asked organizations which kind their live production monitoring is built for today. Grouped by what is actually being watched, the split is stark: 51% of organizations monitor only whether the agent is functioning, while 23% monitor whether its answers are right. Counting the ad-hoc reviewers and the don't-knows, roughly three-quarters of organizations run no automated, real-time evaluation of output correctness in production — they can see that the system is up and what it costs, and they are taking the correctness of its answers on faith. That blind spot is the runtime counterpart to the pre-deployment gap in Finding 1: the same organizations engineering the human out of the deployment decision mostly cannot see, in real time, when the deployed agent starts getting things wrong. Finding 6: Bought on cost, measured on consistency Price and integration drive selection; evaluation consistency is the goal We asked what most influenced enterprises’ choice of an evaluation vendor, and what they treat as their primary measure of success. Both answers are pragmatic. Enterprises buy evaluation tooling on economics and trust it on repeatability. Cost of evaluations (28%) narrowly leads selection, just ahead of ease of integration (27%) and evaluation accuracy (24%) — breadth of observability (13%) and vendor roadmap (4%) matter far less. On what success looks like, more than a third (36%) name evaluation consistency — getting the same verdict on the same behavior every time — well ahead of speed of experimentation (19%), reduction in failures (18%), production visibility (13%), and compliance (11%). The emphasis on consistency is telling: before enterprises can trust an evaluation’s verdict, they need it to be stable — the very property whose absence (bias and inconsistency) ranked among the top trust limitations in Finding 2. Satisfaction with current tooling is only moderate, averaging 3.8 on a five-point scale across overall satisfaction, ease of implementation, and value for money. Finding 7: The next dollar goes to humans and observability Investment is flowing to oversight, not just automation We asked which reliability and evaluation investment will grow most over the next year. The money is going toward watching agents more closely — including with people. The second-largest planned investment — behind only production observability — is human review workflows, at 26%. Read against Finding 1, that is the report's quietest contradiction: at the same moment two-thirds of enterprises are engineering the human out of the deployment decision, more of them plan to grow spending on human reviewers (26%) than on the automated evaluation pipelines (16%) that would replace them. The zero-human trajectory and the human-review budget are rising in the same companies at the same time. Indeed, only 8% report that their budget is not increasing. Taken together, enterprises are hedging: building toward autonomy while spending to watch agents more closely and keep humans available for the calls that automated evaluation cannot yet be trusted to make. Finding 8: A tooling reshuffle is coming Nearly two-thirds plan to adopt or switch platforms within a year We asked whether enterprises plan to adopt a new, additional, or replacement evaluation platform, and which they are considering. Few intend to stand pat. The evaluation market is wide open. While 36% have no plans to change, a clear majority (64%) intend to adopt a new, additional, or replacement platform within twelve months, and 31% within the next quarter. The consideration set points where current usage is thinnest: Confident AI’s DeepEval leads what enterprises are evaluating (20%), ahead of OpenAI’s native evals (13%) and Braintrust (9%) — the open-source specialists drawing more interest than their present footprint. Given that so many enterprises today rely on provider-native tools or nothing at all (Finding 4), this is less a defection than a first real wave of tooling adoption — the moment the evaluation layer starts to consolidate. Which platforms earn that trust, in a market where almost no one trusts automated evaluation yet, is the open question this series will keep tracking. The bottom line: An evaluation gap that autonomy will widen, not close Organizations with 100 or more employees are granting AI agents more independence than they trust their evaluations to support. Half have already shipped an agent that passed its evals and then failed a customer; almost none fully trust automated evaluation, chiefly because it doesn’t match real-world outcomes; and most watch production for uptime and cost rather than for whether the agent’s answers are right. Yet two-thirds already allow, or are actively building toward, deploying to production on automated evaluation alone. The vendor market is early and unsettled: the most common primary evaluation tools are provider-native evals, tied with no dedicated tooling at all, and a clear majority plan to adopt or switch platforms within the year. Encouragingly, the next dollar is going to observability and — pointedly — human review, suggesting enterprises sense the gap even as they engineer past it. At 157 respondents in a single wave this is a directional read, skewed toward the mid-market — but the direction is clear: autonomy is being granted on the strength of evaluations that the people granting it do not yet trust. The evaluation gap is not a coverage problem that more tests alone will close; it is a problem of evaluations that reflect reality and can be trusted to gate it. The open question for later waves is whether assurance catches up to autonomy — or whether the false-confidence failures move from customer incidents into changes that deploy themselves. Based on survey responses from 157 qualified enterprise respondents (100+ employees), drawn from a single June 2026 wave. This is a directional read rather than a precise measurement — the sample is self-selected, not a probability sample, and skews toward the mid-market. Respondents include product and program managers, consultants and advisors, directors of engineering/IT, and CIOs/CTOs/CISOs, among other functions, across technology/software, retail/consumer, healthcare/life sciences, manufacturing, and other industries.

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VentureBeat AI / 10:24 PM

Agentic orchestration: Enterprise AI organizations have a deployment problem, not a platform problem — and most are calling chatbots agents

Across 101 enterprises, agent orchestration is consolidating onto model-provider platforms — Anthropic’s Claude leads by a wide margin — chosen for the gravity of the underlying model and judged on reliable multi-step execution. But the ambition runs well ahead of the reality: most deployed “agents” are still chatbot wrappers, the control plane enterprises expect is deliberately hybrid to avoid lock-in, and real-time fiscal control over token burn remains the exception. This wave of VentureBeat Pulse Research examines enterprise agent orchestration: which platforms enterprises run on, what drives the choice, what they optimize for, how they expect agent control to be structured, and — most revealingly — how orchestrated their deployed “agents” actually are and how tightly they control the cost of running them. The central finding is a gap between orchestration ambition and orchestration reality. Enterprises are consolidating fast onto the major model platforms: Anthropic’s Claude is the primary platform for 40%, more than double any rival, followed by Microsoft (18%) and OpenAI (13%). The choice is driven by “model gravity” — native alignment with a state-of-the-art base model (21%) — and success is judged by reliable, multi-step execution (task completion reliability 32%, multi-step workflow management 28%). Yet asked to assess their portfolios honestly, 71% say a quarter or fewer of their deployed “agents” are true multi-step orchestrated workflows rather than single-prompt chatbot wrappers, and only 10% have crossed the halfway mark. The orchestration layer is being built well ahead of the orchestrated portfolio it is meant to run. That gap shapes the architecture enterprises are putting in place. By the end of 2026 a clear majority (51%) expect a hybrid control plane — provider-native plus external orchestration — and only 6% expect to hand control to a provider-managed service, because vendor lock-in (35%) is the risk they fear most if control lives inside a model provider. Investment follows the build-out: agent workflow tooling leads the spend (34%), with security and permissions enforcement (25%) behind. And fiscal control lags throughout — more than a quarter (27%) have no real-time way to stop a runaway agent before the bill arrives. Methodology VentureBeat fielded this survey as part of its ongoing Pulse Research series, this instrument focused on enterprise agent orchestration. Responses are filtered to organizations with 100 or more employees (n=101), drawn from a single June 2026 wave; because this is one wave rather than a pooled multi-month sample, the report reads cross-sectionally and does not infer month-over-month trends. By organization size the sample is spread evenly across the enterprise bands: 100–499 employees, 2,500–9,999, and 50,000+ (21% each), with 10,000–49,999 and 500–2,499 (19% each). By role it is senior and buyer-credible: product and program managers (15%), CIO/CTO/CISO (13%), consultants and advisors (13%), and a spread of data, AI, and engineering directors and VPs, with an “Other” function at 18%. On purchasing, 81% are recommenders, influencers, or final decision-makers for AI solutions (66% recommender/influencer, 15% final decision-maker). Technology/Software is the largest industry at 44%, followed by Financial Services (17%) and Healthcare/Life Sciences (8%). At 101 respondents the sample is robust enough to read directionally with reasonable confidence, though it remains self-selected and is not a probability sample. Finding 1: Orchestration runs on model-provider platforms Anthropic’s Claude leads; open frameworks are marginal We asked which agent orchestration platform enterprises primarily use today. The answer concentrates on the major model providers — and on one in particular. A note on reading these shares. As described in the methodology section, the respondents are self-selected, and this question asked them for a single primary platform — so the figures measure which platform leads each enterprise's deployment, within a self-selected audience of AI-active technical decision-makers. A sample built this way can diverge substantially from spend-weighted market measures, and each VB Pulse survey draws its own sample with its own company-size mix, so vendor figures should not be compared across our surveys either. Read these shares as a portrait of where this cohort has placed its primary orchestration bet today, rather than as market share. The model platforms dominate. Anthropic, Microsoft, OpenAI, Google, and Amazon together account for roughly 80% of deployments (81 of 101), while the open frameworks (LangChain/LangGraph) and custom in-house builds that anchor engineering discussion sit in single digits. Anthropic’s lead — 40%, more than double the next platform — mirrors the “model gravity” selection logic in Finding 2: enterprises are choosing the orchestration layer that comes with the model they want to build on. As with the security vendors in the prior agent-security wave, the tools that define the category in technical circles are not yet where enterprise deployment concentrates. A small 3% are not orchestrating at all. Respondents rate the platforms they run at 3.94 out of 5 overall (109 answered), with “value for money” specifically at 3.94 and “ease of implementation” the weakest score, at 3.85 — placing orchestration near the bottom of our five-tracker satisfaction range, ahead of only evaluation tooling. A rating just under 4 out of 5, from users of whom 96% plan to change their orchestration approach within the year, reads as provisional acceptance: the platforms work well enough to run today, and not well enough to stop the search for something better. The ratings sit alongside near-universal intent to change; this is a layer enterprises tolerate more than they love. Finding 2: Model gravity drives platform selection The base model, not the tooling, decides the platform We asked what most influenced the orchestration platform choice. The single largest factor is the pull of the underlying model — though flexibility and ease of development follow close behind. Model gravity leading is the selection-side explanation for Anthropic’s platform lead: enterprises pick the orchestration environment closest to the frontier model they have standardized on. But the next tier complicates the picture — flexibility across models and tools (17%) and ease of development (17%) say enterprises also want to avoid being trapped by that choice, foreshadowing the lock-in fear in Finding 6. Security and permissions (14%) and total cost of ownership (11%) round out a pragmatic buying logic. Performance (latency/memory) sits last at 4%, a reminder that at this stage of adoption the binding constraints are model fit and optionality, not raw speed. Finding 3: The job is reliable multi-step execution Enterprises just orchestration by whether it completes the work We asked what enterprises optimize for — their primary success metric for orchestration. Reliability and multi-step workflow management dominate; developer- and user-facing metrics trail. Task completion reliability (32%) and multi-step workflow management (28%) together account for 59% of responses (60 of 101): orchestration succeeds, in the enterprise view, when it reliably carries a task through multiple steps to completion. Developer productivity (17%) matters but is secondary — the inverse of its prominence in framework discussion — and end-user experience (9%) is a minor concern, consistent with orchestration being an internal execution problem rather than a UX one. This reliability-first standard is exactly what makes the Chatbot Trap finding so pointed: enterprises define success as dependable multi-step execution, yet most of their deployed “agents” do not yet do multi-step work at all. The trap is not evenly distributed. Splitting the sample by organization size, 77% of smaller enterprises say a quarter or fewer of their agents do true multi-step work, against 62% of larger ones. Larger enterprises are meaningfully further into genuine multi-step deployment; the chatbot trap is, directionally, a mid-market condition. Finding 4: Consolidate, productionize, and build in-house Three strategic moves are nearly tied for the year ahead We asked what major change enterprises anticipate in their orchestration strategy over the next 12 months. Three moves cluster at the top, almost evenly split. The top three — building in-house control (25%), standardizing on one framework (24%), and moving agents from sandbox to production (23%) — are statistically indistinguishable and tell a single story: enterprises are moving from experimentation to operational consolidation. They want fewer frameworks, more production exposure, and more ownership of the control layer; only 4% expect no change. The appetite for custom in-house control planes is notable alongside the platform concentration in Finding 1 — enterprises are standardizing on model-provider platforms while simultaneously planning to wrap them in control logic they own, the hybrid posture that Finding 6 makes explicit. Finding 5: Nearly seven in 10 plan to switch — and the biggest group of movers has no shortlist The strategic change enterprises anticipate (previous finding) comes with vendor motion attached. Asked whether they plan to adopt a new, additional, or replacement agent orchestration platform in the next twelve months, more respondents are moving here than in any other layer we track. Asked which platforms they are considering, the most common answer among those in motion is none yet: 29% of all respondents are evaluating without a shortlist, the largest single response after "not considering a change." Among named candidates, OpenAI leads at 16%, followed by LangChain/LangGraph at 12% and Anthropic at 7% — and notably, the independent frameworks draw roughly double their current usage footprint in forward consideration, the same pattern our security tracker found for specialist vendors. Read with this report's concentration and lock-in findings, the picture completes itself: the major model-platform providers hold roughly four-fifths of today's primary usage, vendor lock-in has become the leading fear, 96% anticipate a strategic change — and now the purchase intent to act on all of it, with the largest bloc of buyers still undecided. The most concentrated layer of the agentic stack is also, as of June, the least settled. Finding 6: Investment flows to workflow tooling Tooling and permissions lead the spend; monitoring trails We asked which orchestration-related investment will grow most next year. Agent workflow tooling leads, with security and permissions enforcement behind. Workflow tooling leading (34%) is the budget-side expression of the reliability-and-multi-step priority in Finding 3: the money is going to the machinery that strings steps together dependably. Security and permissions enforcement (25%) and scaling infrastructure (20%) follow — the investments required to take agents from sandbox into production, the strategic move in Finding 4. Monitoring and debugging draws a smaller 11%, with another 11% reporting flat budgets. The weight on tooling, permissions, and scaling over pure observability signals that enterprises are spending to build and harden orchestration, not merely to watch it run. Finding 7: The control plane will be hybrid — and lock-in is why Enterprises expect to split control between providers and their own layer We asked where enterprises expect the primary control plane for agents to live by the end of 2026, and what worries them most if that control sits inside a model-provider platform. A clear majority expect a hybrid model — and vendor lock-in is the reason. Hybrid control is the dominant expectation by a wide margin (51%), and only 6% expect to hand control to a provider-managed service outright. Read together, the hybrid, custom, and externally-abstracted options — every architecture that keeps control at least partly outside the provider — sum to 88% (89 of 101). The reason surfaces directly when we asked about the risk of provider-resident control: vendor lock-in leads at 35% (35 of 101), ahead of security and permissioning limitations (28%) and inflexibility across models and tools (21%). The pattern echoes the prior wave’s “don’t trust the model to police itself” posture — here, enterprises will build on a provider’s platform but decline to be governed entirely by it. The hybrid control plane is the architectural hedge against the lock-in they most fear. The June figure asserting a preference for a hybrid control plane marks movement from earlier. In the April–May survey (n=145), only 34% expected a hybrid control plane, and a greater number (12%) expected to hand control fully to a provider-managed service. These two snapshots don’t yet measure a confirmed longitudinal trend — but the direction of the conversation is unambiguous: toward keeping control. Lock-in is also a new arrival as a top concern. In the April–May wave, the leading concern was security and permissioning limitations (32%), with lock-in second at 24%; by June the two had traded places. The worry about provider platforms appears to be maturing from whether they can be secured to whether they can be replaced. Finding 8: The chatbot trap — most “agents” aren’t agents yet Enterprises admit most deployments are still chatbot wrappers We asked enterprises to assess their portfolios honestly: what share of their deployed “agents” are true multi-step orchestrated workflows versus simple single-prompt chatbot wrappers. The answer is the defining finding of this wave. This is the gap at the center of the report. Combining the bottom two bands, 71% of enterprises (72 of 101) say a quarter or fewer of their deployed “agents” are genuinely orchestrated — and just 10% (10 of 101) have crossed the halfway mark. The ambition documented in the earlier findings — model-provider platforms, reliability-first success metrics, production rollouts, a deliberate control architecture — runs well ahead of the deployed reality, which remains overwhelmingly single-prompt assistants dressed as agents. This is less a contradiction than a roadmap: the platforms, budgets, and strategies are being put in place precisely because the orchestrated portfolio is still so thin. The open question for later waves is how fast the reality closes on the ambition. Finding 9: Fiscal control is still reactive Only a minority can stop a runaway agent before the bill arrives Finally, we asked how enterprises enforce fiscal control over agent token consumption — the risk that an autonomous loop exhausts a budget before anyone intervenes. Most rely on native caps or after-the-fact monitoring; real-time programmatic control is the exception. More than a quarter of enterprises (27%) admit they have no real-time, programmatic way to stop an agent before a budget-breaking bill arrives — they learn of it from the logs afterward. Another 32% lean entirely on the native caps and throttles built into their primary platform, a control only as good as the provider’s tooling and one that ties back to the lock-in concern of Finding 6. The enterprises building custom gateways (23%) or exploiting cross-model routing to arbitrage cost (19%) are the ones treating token burn as an engineering problem to be controlled deterministically. As with orchestration maturity, fiscal control is an area where the operational reality lags the ambition: agents are moving toward production faster than the cost-control plane around them is being built. It’s worth noting, a split appears according to company size: roughly one in three enterprises under 2,500 employees (34%) exercises only reactive control of agent spend, against 20% of larger enterprises — directional figures, but consistent with the chatbot-trap split. The mid-market is running the least mature agents on the least instrumented budgets. The bottom line: The layer is real; most of the agents aren't yet Organizations with 100 or more employees describe an orchestration strategy that is consolidating quickly and maturing slowly. They are standardizing — for now — on model-provider platforms, which collectively hold roughly four-fifths of primary usage, chosen for the gravity of the underlying model, and they judge success by reliable multi-step execution. Investment is flowing to workflow tooling and permissions, the strategy is to consolidate frameworks and push agents into production, and the control plane they expect is deliberately hybrid, because vendor lock-in is the risk they fear most. But the standardization is provisional: 68% plan to adopt a new, additional, or replacement orchestration platform within twelve months — the highest switching intent of any layer we track — and the largest group of those movers has not yet shortlisted a candidate. Today's concentration describes where enterprises are, and visibly does not describe where they intend to stay. But the honest self-assessment punctures the ambition. Seventy-one percent say a quarter or fewer of their deployed "agents" are truly orchestrated, only 10% are past the halfway mark, and more than a quarter cannot stop a runaway agent in real time. The orchestration layer — the platforms, the budgets, the control architecture — is being built ahead of the orchestrated portfolio it is meant to run. At 101 respondents in a single June wave this reads as a clear directional signal rather than a precise measurement: enterprises have decided how they want to orchestrate agents well before most of their agents are doing anything an orchestration layer is for. The questions for subsequent waves are whether the deployed reality closes the gap on the ambition — and, with nearly seven in ten buyers in motion and most of them undecided, which platforms the settled stack finally lands on. Based on survey responses from 101 qualified enterprise respondents (100+ employees), drawn from a single June 2026 wave. Because this is one wave rather than a pooled multi-month sample, results read directionally rather than as a confirmed trend. Respondents include product and program managers, CIOs, CTOs and CISOs, consultants and advisors, and directors and VPs of data, AI, and engineering, across Technology/Software, Financial Services, Healthcare, and other sectors.

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